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ABSTRACT. As the United States northern neighbor, Canada serves as a NATO ally and a
strategic partner with Washington through the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). Canadian forces have fought honorably and bravely in concert with American
forces in many wars. Canada’s Government, however, has been less consistent in promoting a
credible vision of Canadian national security policy and geopolitical interests in its defense
white papers. These documents have often contained idealistic rhetoric about adhering to a
rules-based international order and defending freedom. In reality, Canadian governments of
varying political parties have consistently failed to provide the sustained funding and
coherent national security strategy to make Ottawa an effective partner with the U.S. and
the NATO alliance in addressing historical and emerging national security threats. This
article examines Canadian defense white papers for several decades and recommends ways
Canada can ensure its defense policy planning can have greater credibility in the national
security policymaking corridors of its allies and with potential adversaries.
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Introduction
Throughout its history, Canada has struggled to develop consistent defense rhetoric
and policy to match its lofty rhetoric about promoting international peace and
security while being a valued member of the world’s free nations. While Canadian
military personnel have frequently fought and died for freedom, their government
7

has been inconsistent in ensuring Canada has the military force structure and
political and fiscal support necessary to remain a militarily credible member of the
world’s free nations and a valued ally of the U.S. This has been reflected in
oscillating Canadian political attitudes and levels of public participation in the
defense policymaking process from willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in
continental and global security matters to a sanctimonious and utopian rhetorical
idealism seeking to delusionally distance Canadians from hard power realities of
human nature and international politics and security. This national security freeriding has occurred due to Ottawa’s geographic proximity to the U.S. and close
integration with U.S. military policymaking structures such as North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).1
Frustration over Canada’s uncertain attitudes toward defense policy and spending
was reflected in a February 3, 1947 speech in Canada’s House of Commons by MP
John Bracken (1883–1969) (Progressive Conservative (PC)-Neepewa, MB) attacking
the Liberal Government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (1874–
1950) (Liberal (LIB)-Glengarry, ON):
We have been placed in a ludicrous position. From the point of view of
effectiveness we were the fourth striking power in the war, and we were
in it from the time it began. We were welcomed on the battlefields, but
we are excluded from the peace talks. Our soldiers were asked to fight,
occupy a place in decisive battles and help to win wars. When it comes to
peace making we are gracefully accorded only the privilege of submitting
our views. Either we are a part of this world organization or we are not,
and until all the mysticism is cleared away about what we are – a little,
middle, or great power, a power on our own, a power working in cooperation in cooperation with other British countries, a North American
power in association with the United States – until our government makes
up its mind on some such questions as these, who can say whether our
defence money is wasted or not?2

Canada was one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founding
members with Foreign Minister Lester Pearson (1897–1972) (LIB-Algoma East,
ON) signing the original agreement on April 4, 1949 in Washington, DC. Pearson,
who would later serve as Prime Minister from 1963 to 1968 also personified the
idealistic utopian strand of Canadian security policymaking winning the Nobel Peace
Prize for proposing and sponsoring the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping
force in the Sinai Peninsula following the 1956 Arab–Israeli war which also
involved France and the United Kingdom.3
Demonstrations of realism in Canadian national security policymaking during
the 1950s were provided by Ottawa’s participation in the Korean War in which
more than 26,000 Canadians served and 516 were killed4 and by the May 12, 1958
NORAD agreement. This pact began in 1955 and sees U.S. and Canadian military
forces engaging in aerospace warning and control of North American aerospace by
monitoring man-made objects in space and detecting, validating, and warning of
8

attack against North America by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. NORAD is
part of the U.S.’ Northern Command (NORTHCOM) force structure and an April
28, 2006 extension to this agreement expanded this coverage to include maritime
approaches with this arrangement being headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base
(AFB), CO. These objectives are accomplished through networks of satellites,
ground-based radar, airborne radar, and fighters to detect, intercept, and engage any
air-breathing threats to North America. NORAD’s commander is appointed by and
responsible to the U.S. President and Canadian Prime Minister. Additional NORAD
facilities are located at Elmendorf AFB, AK, Tyndall AFB, FL; and Canadian
Forces Base Winnipeg, MB.5
Despite this variegated national defense and international peacekeeping activity,
Canada did not begin compiling defense white papers and engaging in the complicated policymaking process of preparing these documents until the 1960s in an
effort to develop a distinctively Canadian defense policymaking contrasting with
British or American policies.6
1963 Royal Commission on Government Organization
(John Diefenbaker/Lester Pearson)
Some impetus for compiling a uniquely Canadian defense policy was instigated by
the 1960 Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission
named for prominent Canadian businessman John Grant Glassco (1905–1968)
established when John Diefenbaker (PC) (Prince Albert, SK) (1895–1979) was
Prime Minister which sought to address the managerial efficiency of Canadian
government agencies in the early 1960s. The section on Canada’s Department of
National Defence (DND) when this department’s report was released in 1963
stressed that DND had been singled out due to its size, range and cost of activities,
impact of Western defense alliances, and consisting of military and civilian personnel. The Glassco Commission noted that the $CAN 1.652 billion ($CAN 13.381
billion in 2017) spent by this department in this year represented 25% of total federal
expenditures and involved supporting 126,500 personnel.7
This report also stressed the Canadian defense arrangements do not envision
independent military action by Canadian forces and that such forces are designed to
operate collaboratively with NATO, NORAD, and United Nations peacekeeping
activities. This document went on to stress that unification of Canadian military
forces may be required maintaining:
Although no western country has yet achieved unification of its Armed
Forces, doubts have been raised in all countries in all countries in recent
years about the traditional Service basis of organization. Combined operations are becoming the rule rather than the exception, with each mission
requiring the participation and close cooperation of all three Services.
Operationally, the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Air Force
(RCAF) bear a much more distant relationship to the Air Division in
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Europe or the air defence forces under NORAD than to the anti-submarine
forces of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN); both elements operate, in the
North Atlantic, under the command of SACLANT (Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic).8

The Commission cautioned that effective force consolidation could not be based on
joint control of the three military services if the government desired to maintain
traditional responsibility of individual service Chiefs of Staff for armed forces
control and administration. This document went on to recommend the Chairman of
the Chiefs of Staff receive “control and administration” of elements common to
two or more services as designated by the Defense Minister and that the new title
of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff become “Chief of Canadian Defence Staffs.”9
1964 White Paper (Pearson)
Recommendations from the Glassco Commission played a key role in the Pearson
Government’s March 1964 defense white paper whose principal author was Defense
Minister Paul Hellyer (LIB-Trinity, ON). This document opened by stressing that
Canadian defense policy objectives included preserving peace by supporting
measures for deterring military aggression; supporting Canadian foreign policy
including Ottawa’s participation in international organizations; and providing for
protecting and surveilling national territory, airspace, and coastal waters. It went on
to stress the emergence of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery systems
as posing new problems for North American defense; emphasized the need for
Canada to establish a Joint Staff and develop means for joint planning and intelligence; naively believed that China would not acquire an effective nuclear arsenal;
and realistically recognized that many Communist leaders consider détente as
a tactical measure and a means to buy time.10
It went on to stress that Canadian defense is part of the larger strategic issue of
North American defense, emphasized what Ottawa saw as the critical importance
of participating in United Nations peace-keeping, and sought to move its military
toward a more unified organizational structure without providing cost estimates on
how much funding or personnel capabilities would be required to meet these
objectives. The emphasis on force unification for perceived cost-benefit and organizational safety purposes is detailed in the following assertion:
Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government
has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration
of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and
a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified
defence force for Canada. The integrated control of all aspects of planning
and operations should not only produce a more effective and coordinated
defence posture for Canada, but should also result in considerable savings.
Thus, integration will result in a substantial reduction of manpower
strengths in headquarters, training and related establishments, along with
10

other operating and maintenance costs. The total savings to be effected as
a result of such reductions will make available funds for capital equipment
purchases, and eventually make possible more equitable distribution of
the defence dollar between equipment and housekeeping costs. Sufficient
savings should accrue from unification and permit a goal of 25% of the
budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years
ahead.11

On July 6–7, 1964 Canada’s House of Commons debated bill C-90 containing much
of the content of the Defense White Paper including proposals on military force
unification. Criticism of this legislation was expressed by former Defence Minister
and MP Douglas Harkness (1903–1999) (PC-Calgary North) who noted Parliament
had received no evidence that the new system would not be more confusing or
cumbersome than the status quo and that there would be four or five chains of
command from the top down to individual units. He went on to stress how important
it was for the Defence Minister to receive separate independent military advice
instead of being exclusively dependent on one source of military advice. 12
Hellyer stressed that this legislation would implement Section 5 of the White
Paper calling for implementing and expanding the capabilities of Canadian Forces
out to 1974, stressed that the Air Force had more than enough pilots to execute its
missions, and that the government had fulfilled its responsibilities in providing for
national defense requirements. Bill C-90 was approved by voice vote on July 7,
1964.13
1967 Canadian Forces Unification (Pearson)
The Pearson Government went ahead with its plans to unify Canadian military forces
in 1967. This produced contentious and controversial debate which continues affecting Canadian defense policymaking five decades later. Debate on Bill C-243 The
Canadian Forces Reorganization Act consumed much of April 1967. MP Josh
McIntosh (1909–1988) (PC-Swift Current-Maple Creek, SK) criticized the proposed
unification on April 4, 1967 contending that it made sense only if Canada opted out
of its other defense commitments, that there was no way of knowing how it would
impact Canada’s security and unification’s impact on Canadian allies, and that the
Defence Minister was destroying combat troops and making them useless for
existing military commitments if unification occurred. He also proclaimed:
Unification will not save the taxpayers money. It will not improve the
effectiveness of our armed forces. Unification will disrupt and destroy the
alliances to which we are now committed. It will destroy our national
sovereignty and destroy our national pride. It will get us into many
situations that will be dangerous for us.14

On April 11, 1967 Hellyer defended forces unification and government defense
planning maintaining that they would provide a CAN $1.5 billion five year equip11

ment program for the Canadian forces including armored personnel carriers and
reconnaissance vehicles; the capacity for peacekeeping operations; anti-tank missiles
and guns; helicopter-equipped destroyers to increase naval anti-submarine capacity;
purchasing additional operation support ships; and mobile force fighter bombers.
He went on to contend that such equipment would give Canadian forces the ability
to carry out tasks mandated in the 1964 Defence White Paper.15
Bill C-243 was ultimately approved in a 127–73 general party line vote on April
25, 1967. It went into affect on February 1, 1968 when the RCN, RCAF, and
Canadian Army were eliminated and unified into the Canadian Armed Forces
which became known as the Canadian Forces. This ostensible unification did not
eliminate armed service branch loyalties with a 2009 analysis of this legislation
saying it created a bias against national security planning from a national perspective
and tied to annual federal budget dynamics.
2009 analysis of this legislation stressed that Hellyer rejected Pearson’s advice
to retain important elements of service traditions and many distinctions between air,
land, and sea components. Hellyer dismissed this recommendation and believed
that all Canadian military personnel should wear the same green uniform, have the
same rank structure and promotion ladder, have the opportunity to be employed
across all three services, and identify themselves primarily with the Canadian
Forces and consequently change their value and loyalties. This did not occur and
service-centered loyalty remains entrenched in Canadian military culture though
this culture must evolve to meet emerging national security challenges instead of
blaming flawed historical policy decisions.16
1971 White Paper (Pierre Trudeau)
The next Canadian Defence White Paper Defence in the 70s was issued in February
1971 by Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1919–2000) (LIB-Mount Royal,
QC) and Defence Minister Donald MacDonald (LIB-Rosedale, ON). This document
reflected the Trudeau Government’s desire to maintain some distance between
Canada and the U.S. on military issues, Trudeau’s desire to develop a distinctively
“Canadian identity” on the international stage, aspirations for upgrading Canadian
rhetoric about the importance of international peacekeeping and protecting national
sovereignty, while attempting and achieving limited success in efforts to develop
and fund a coherent national defense policy.17
Rationales for developing this document included desiring to focus on the
strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union, Richard Nixon’s
upcoming visit to China, and the desire to promote Canadian interests in the Arctic
including emphasizing promoting “social justice” and ensuring a harmonious
national environment. This document preposterously claimed that bomber defenses
made military bombers relatively less important, that peacekeeping remained a
core component of Canadian foreign and defense policy resulting in preventing or
spreading hostilities, and believed that Canadians should not worry about nuclear
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fallout resulting from U.S. anti-ballistic missiles intercepting Soviet missiles flying
over Canada, and contended that an agreement limiting deployment of ABM systems
would be beneficial to Canadian security interests.18
One clear point in this document is the key role geography plays in Canadian
security as reflected in the following statement:
Canada is a three-ocean maritime nation with one of the longest coastlines
in the world, and a large portion of the trade vital to our economic
strength goes by sea. The Government is concerned that Canada’s many
and varied interests in the waters close to our shores, on the seabed
extending from our coasts, and on the high seas beyond, be protected.19

This document went on to describe how Canada has passed legislation extending
its territorial sea from three to twelve miles; that fishing zones encompassing 80,000
square miles had been established in Queen Charlotte Sound, Dixon Entrance and
Hecate Strait on the West Coast, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of
Fundy on the East Coast. The report went on to acknowledge the importance of air
and maritime surveillance in protecting Canadian waters and airspace with this
capability being most effective by submarines in temperate zone waters but not in
detecting Arctic water submarine activity.20
This report, while recognizing Canada’s security challenges, refused to commit
to specific defense spending levels based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) other
than staying within 1% of GDP and reducing manpower to a level of 83,000. The
unwillingness of Canada to sustain a credible level of defense spending to meet
NATO and NORAD obligations has been a hallmark characteristic since 1960 with
the GDP of Canadian defense spending dropping from 4.143% in 1960 to less than
0.991% in 2016. While Ottawa’s defense spending rose from $CAN 1.538 billion
in 1960 to $CAN 5.063 billion in 1980, Canada’s preeminent commitment to social
program spending and transfers to provinces is reflected in these expenditures
rising from $CAN 1.764 billion in 1960 to $CAN 25.371 billion in 1980. In 1960
Canada’s mobilized military manpower was 120,000 from a population of 17.91
million while in 1972–1973, Canada’s mobilized military manpower had dropped
to 84,000 from a population of 21.8 million.21
1987 White Paper (Brian Mulroney)
Except for a brief Conservative minority government under Joe Clark (PC-Yellowhead, AB) in 1979–1980, Trudeau and a brief Liberal Government in 1984 by John
Turner (Vancouver Quadra, BC), dominated Canadian government and its defense
policymaking during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. However, in 1984
Canadians elected a Conservative Government lead by Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney (Baie Comeau, QC) which held power with a parliamentary majority
until 1993. These years saw improved Canadian relations with the U.S. due to the
presence of somewhat similar ideological administrations of Ronald Reagan and
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George H.W. Bush and the strong personal relationship Mulroney had with these
two presidents.22
Canada’s first defense white paper under Mulroney’s Government was released
in 1987 and also involved the influence of Defence Minister Perrin Beatty (PCWellington, Grey, Dufferin, Simcoe, ON). This document reflected the ongoing
reality of the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union and sought to contrast
what it saw as Liberal defense policy deficiencies by promoting an honest assessment of Canadian national security and to provide sufficient financial resources to
execute national security requirements.
This paper acknowledged that détente’s early promise was exaggerated, that
East–West relationship problems were not readily negotiable, and that Canadian
security policy must promote a stable international environment due to Canada’s
geographic location between two heavily armed superpowers. Emphasis was placed
on the existing importance of the Arctic and Western Europe to Canadian security,
acknowledging the Asia-Pacific region’s emerging importance, and stressing the increasing Soviet military use of space demonstrated by having nearly 150 operational
orbital satellites with over 90% of these engaged in gathering intelligence on
Canada.23
Challenge and Commitment also stressed the importance of protecting Canada’s
Arctic sovereignty, urged creation of a nuclear submarine program to assist in this
effort, stressed the age of Canada’s military equipment including the Navy relying
exclusively on ships in commission or under construction in 1971, ship, the Air
Force using 75% of the aircraft it had in 1971, regular maritime forces of 10,000,
land forces of 22,500, and air forces of 23,050. It acknowledged Canada’s inability
to carry out Arctic Sovereignty operations by air and sea while also expressing
concern that Ottawa might have to surrender space-based surveillance operations to
the U.S. The Mulroney Government proposed increasing defense spending by 2%
annually after inflation for the next fifteen years, recognized that increase beyond
that might be necessary, and that there would be sufficient flexibility in this spending
to account for changing financial, military, strategic, and technological developments.24
Initial public response to this document was positive as reflected in newspaper
articles and broadcast commentaries. Between 1984 and 1990, Canadian defense
spending saw the following increases:
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

$CAN 7.9 billion ($10.356 billion)
$CAN 8.386 billion ($11.488 billion)
$CAN 9.143 billion ($12.617 billion)
$CAN 9.708 billion ($12.717 billion)
$CAN 10.206 billion ($12.553 billion)
$CAN 10.982 billion $12.958 billion
$CAN 11.323 billion ($13.134 billion)25
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This document was criticized for failing to discuss internal security or rank defense
priorities and not addressing the expensive nature of defense weapons systems
technologies. Criticism was also leveled at the White Paper for failing to explain
why acquiring nuclear submarines was essential for Canadian security. Additional
factors limiting the implementation of this document were improving relations
between the West and the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure resulting in the Soviet Union’s ultimate collapse and increasing Canadian budget deficits
which saw Canada’s national debt rise from $CAN 24.887 billion in 1984 to $CAN
45.034 billion in 1990 which would see Ottawa’s defense spending fall to $CAN
$10.580 billion ($14.394 billion) by 1994.26
1992 White Paper (Mulroney)
The initial early post-Cold War defense white paper released by Canada was also
produced by Mulroney’s Government and Defence Minister Marcel Masse (1936–
2014) (PC-Frontenac, QC). 27 Canadian Defence Policy noted the seismic geopolitical and strategic changes wrought by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Where
Europe was concerned this document noted the following paradoxical reality:
Nationalism is in the ascendant. It can be a powerful constructive force.
Yet, as ancient nations reappear, ethnic hatreds also rekindle the violent
confrontations of earlier eras. Ironically, even as nationalism reshapes the
borders of Central and Eastern Europe, the nations of the continents
western half are foregoing sovereign prerogatives in the interest of greater
economic efficiency and political stability. At their historic December 1991
meeting in Maastricht, European Community leaders agreed to a further
monetary integration and increased cooperation in security and defence
matters.28

This document also noted the increasing role of religion as a source of tension and
division in various global areas and that globalization can have positive and negative
effects in global regions. It also stressed that Canada continues to see NATO as a
force for European stability and Canada’s willingness to make its forces available
to NATO if crisis or war occurs and remain closely engaged in European security.
It also stressed the only the U.S. has the military capabilities necessary to defend
North America’s geographic expanses and that Canada would maintain its existing
security relationship with the U.S.29
Changing international strategic environments and domestic political and economic contingencies, however, would require Canada to end its military bases in
Europe and reduce the size of its armed forces from 84,000 regulars in September
1991 to 76,000 by 1995–1996 while defense spending would decline to $CAN
10.580 billion ($14.394 billion) by 1994. This document also announced plans to
cancel construction of a facility in Kuujuag, QC, close a military station in Bermuda
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in 1994, and consolidate regional supply and publications depots to locations in
Edmonton and Montreal.30
This document also stressed that Canada must maintain its ability to defend
against air attacks and would do so by enhancing aerial surveillance and reconnaissance capability by enhancing CF-18 fighter squadron capability at Cold Lake,
AB, and Bagotville, QC while providing additional air squadrons at Comox, BC,
and Shearwater, NS for combat support, electronic warfare training, and coastal
patrol while also assisting maritime and land forces. It also emphasized Ottawa’s
strong belief in maintaining and strengthening international arms control regimes
such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and Missile
Technology Control Regime.31
This white paper was criticized in various Canadian newspapers as being a
“muddle of wishful thinking and idle negligence,” the State Department expressing
disappointment over planned troop withdrawals; that it is bad policy for the Finance
Minister instead of the Defence Minister to set defense policy; and Navy Captain
Robert Thomas said the white paper was more inward looking than Canadian foreign
policy and criticizing the document’s naval policy contending:
The attempt to respond to a full range of maritime tasks inherent in the
announced defence policy is neither economically or militarily sound….
With a skimpy fleet divided between two coasts (and unable to guard the
third), the resulting capacity will be insufficient to fully satisfy national
requirements or to make a significant difference to an alliance…. The
Canadian Navy of the future cannot satisfy national security requirements
if it tries to be all things to all people.

Thomas went on to argue that the planned acquisition of six new conventional
submarines and six new corvettes should be cancelled and that 18 new frigates
should be purchased to build what he saw as a stronger more flexible Navy.32
1994 White Paper (Jean Chretien)
The next two years saw significant change in Canada’s electoral composition.
Mulroney’s increasingly unpopular government ended with his 1993 resignation
and brief replacement as Prime Minister by Kim Campbell (PC-Vancouver Centre,
BC).33 This unpopularity resulted in a splintering of the Progressive Conservative
Party with a conservative populist Reform (REF) party based in Western Canada
and lead by Preston Manning (REF-Calgary Southwest, AB) taking away support
from the PC’s. This ideological splintering proved to be a political windfall for the
Liberals who won a decisive victory in the 1993 election reducing the PC’s to two
House of Commons seats and giving Reform 52 seats while paving the way to
thirteen consecutive years of Liberal governance with Jean Chretien being (LIBSan Maurice, QC) Prime Minister from 1993–2003.34
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The 1994 White Paper on Defence was the premier defense policy document of
Chretien’s premiership and produced by Defence Minister David Collenette (LIBDon Valley East, ON). Its rhetoric reflected the idea of a “peace dividend” due to
the Soviet Union’s collapse apparently obviating the need for significant Canadian
military forces. This mindset and concern in Chretien’s government over reducing
a $CAN 40 billion budget deficit saw defense spending decrease 30% in real terms
between 1993–1994 and 1998–1999; military personnel reduced from 75,000
to 50,000 and the delay and cancellation of new equipment.35
Broad topical white paper contents included proclaiming the Cold War’s conclusion, the rise of ethnic, religious, and political extremism and the spread of
advanced weapons technologies as major security problems, the need for combat
capable forces within budgetary constraints, protecting Canada by being able to
monitor and control activity within national territory, airspace, and maritime jurisdictional areas, maintaining defense cooperation with the U.S., and contributing to
international security by participating in multinational peacekeeping operations,
strengthening the United Nations, and participating and reforming NATO.36
Specific combat operational capabilities promised by this document included:
• A naval task force with up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates, or submarines) and a support ship with appropriate maritime air support;
• Three separate battle groups or a brigade group consisting of three infantry
battalions, an armored regime and artillery regiment with appropriate combat and
combat service support;
• A wing of fighter aircraft with appropriate support and a squadron of tactical
transport aircraft;
• Earmarking an infantry battalion group as a UN standby force or serving with
NATO’s intermediate reaction force; and
• Terminating Canada’s commitment to maintain a battalion group for defending
northern Norway.37
Further provisions of this document included cutting acquisitions by at least $CAN
15 billion over the next 15 years, reducing the DND civilian workforce to approximately 20,000 by 1999, placing acute emphasis on social engineering in Canadian
forces employment by providing “equitable employment opportunities” for personnel
regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture, and reducing anti-submarine
warfare activities, focusing on protecting shipping and countering missile-carrying
submarines in the North Atlantic and increasing participation in UN and multilateral
operations.38
This document reflects a reassertion of idealism and utopianism in Canadian
national security policymaking. It may have been realistic in terms of Canada’s
budgetary environment and extant public opinion and in reflecting increasing Canadian interest in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific. However, it did not accommodate for Canadian participation in the Kosovo War and intrastate conflicts in
countries as varied as East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia resulting in increasing
operational tempo and stress on Canadian Forces, the rise of Islamist terrorism, the
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emerging threat of ballistic missiles and the refusal to develop indigenous ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems or participate in the U.S. BMD system, and displeasure by Canadian military officers that their concerns about operational
capability erosions were not listened to by policymakers unwilling to cope with the
reality that international military commitments require high-quality personnel,
equipment, and significant financial resources to sustain and have domestic and
international credibility.39
2004 National Security Policy (Paul Martin)
Chretien resigned in 2003 and was replaced in 2004 by Paul Martin (LIB-Lasalle,
Emard, QC).40 Between 2000 and 2006 Canadian defense spending was:
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

$CAN 12.314 billion ($12.787 billion)
$CAN 13.191 billion ($13.126 billion)
$CAN 13.379 billion ($13.193 billion)
$CAN 14.143 billion ($13.436 billion)
$CAN 14.951 billion ($13.945 billion)
$CAN 16.001 billion ($14.558 billion)
$CAN 17.066 billion ($15.234 billion)41

This period also saw the numbers of Canadian military personnel increase from
81,600 in 2001 to 87,700 in 2006. Key reasons for these increases included the 9/11
terrorist attacks in the U.S., the need for Canada to increase its border control and
counterterrorism capabilities, and Canadian participation in antiterrorist operations
in military operations in Afghanistan. A key step in upgrading Canadian defense
capabilities was the December 2003 establishment of a Department of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness. At the same time, Canada refused to participate in
antiterrorist military operations in Japan and the U.S.’ ballistic missile defense
programs for various reasons including not being seen as to close to the George W.
Bush Administration’s policies, retaining its interest in multilateral and peacekeeping
oriented solutions to international security problems, and deifying United Nations
resolutions as having preeminence over national government policy.42
Martin’s government released a national security policy statement in 2004 and
a defense document to an international policy statement in 2005. His government
would be one that lived on borrowed time due to increasing public dissatisfaction
with a long period of Liberal Government demonstrated by the Quebec sponsorship
scandal which saw government publicity contracts to promote Canadian federalism
in Quebec go to advertising firms connected with the Liberal Party. The evolution
of this scandal diminished public confidence and trust in the Liberals, produced a
highly critical governmental commission report, and ultimately resulted in the
Liberals being toppled from power in January 2006 by the reformed Conservative
Party of Canada (CPC).43
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The April 2004 document was the first Canadian defense white paper in a
decade and involved Martin and Defence Minister David Pratt (LIB-NepeanCarleton, ON). His service as Martin’s defense minister would be cut short by his
June 28, 2004 federal election defeat to a CPC candidate and Bill Graham (LIBToronto Centre, ON) would serve as Defence Minister for the remainder of Martin’s
Government.44
This document claimed Canada’s three core national security interests were:
1. Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
2. Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
3. Contributing to international security.
Additional policy measures described in this document included establishing an
Integrated Threat Assessment Center to ensure all threat-related information is
compiled, assessed, and reaches policymakers needing it in a timely and effective
manner; establishing a National Security Advisory Council consisting of nongovernmental experts; developing an advisory Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security consisting of members of Canadian ethno-cultural and religious communities,
and making the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the
entity responsible for testing and auditing federal agency departments critical
security responsibilities.45
Developing threat assessment capabilities, establishing a National Security
Advisory Council, and giving Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
key security testing and auditing powers are sound measures. However, establishing a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security is pandering to separatism and group
identity politics when national security policymaking should be focused on national
cohesion and a coordinated national governmental response to security crises and
the military strategic and operational realities influencing these crises and the
ability of governments to respond to them. 46
Functional areas of Canadian policymaking targeted in this document included
intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health, transport security,
border security, and international security. Specific performance measures targeted
for enhancement within these component entities included increasing spending to
enhance Canadian intelligence collection capability emphasizing security intelligence; increasing federal cooperation with provincial, territorial, and municipal
emergency operations centers; replenishing and updating the National Emergency
Services Stockpile System; clarifying responsibilities and strengthening marine
security sectoral coordination; deploying facial recognition biometric technology on
Canadian passports consistent with international standards; and ensuring Canadian
Forces are flexible, responsive, and combat-capable for wide operational ranges
including allied interoperability.47
The National Security Strategy was projected to cost over $CAN 500 million
and balance national security with personal freedoms with maritime security being
a major recipient of this funding. The conservative National Post, however,
referenced the recent Al Qaida attack on Madrid’s train station by stressing that
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Canadians do not believe they are locked in the 21st century’s long war against
Islamist terrorism, warning that then current generations of Canadians had not
experienced security environments like their ancestors did in two world wars and
the Cold War, contending that the Martin Government’s policy was short on details
and shorter on money, and warning that it may take the occurrence of terrorist
events within Canada for Canadians to become more security conscious. Criticism
of this nonchalant attitude toward national security was expressed in a letter to the
Ottawa Citizen warning the Canada was good at wasting money on questionable
heritage projects, government advertising, a gun registry, and bilingualism when
giving the military the resources needed to protect the public from terrorism would
be a better use of taxpayer dollars.48
2005 International Policy Defense Statement (Martin)
The following year the Martin government Foreign Ministry released a five volume
series of international policy statements with one of the volumes covering defense
policy. These document compilations were issued by Defence Minister Graham and
Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew (LIB-Papineau, QC) and also covered foreign
affairs, international trade and international development.49
Themes addressed in the defense volume of these reports included the international security environment in the early 21st century, a new vision for Canadian
Forces, protecting Canada and Canadians, the Canada–U.S. defence relationship in
a changing world, contributing to a safer world, and future tasks for Canadian
forces. This document proclaimed that the Canadian forces personnel would be
increased by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reserves which would enable Canada to
participate in international operations anywhere, that land forces would receive the
vast majority of this increase effectively doubling their capacity to undertake
overseas operations, and that Canada would gain the ability to continuously sustain
up to 5,000 personnel on international operations while also better responding to
natural disasters and terrorist attacks.50
This document also noted the increasing operational tempo of Canadian Forces
since 1990 saying that in May 2004 Canada ranked second among NATO countries
in the percentage of personnel deployed on multinational operations and sixth in
terms of total numbers. It also stressed how the complex and chaotic contemporary
operational environment (three-block war) meant that land and naval forces could
carry out integrated operations in one city block, stabilization operations in another
block, and humanitarian operations in an adjacent block while also enforcing
maritime exclusion zones, air forces flying in supplies and humanitarian aid while
also needing to engage opponents. Such developments would require Canadian
forces to better integrate maritime, land, air, and special operations forces; adapt
their capabilities and force structures to deal with threats arising from instability in
failed states; and requiring forces to become more responsive by enhancing their
ability to respond quickly to domestic Canadian or international crises by arriving
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on the scene faster, making rapid transitions to operations upon arrival, moving
more expeditiously within theater, and sustaining deployments for extended
periods.51
This document dubiously claimed that Canada no longer faced the threat of
Russian bombers in Canadian airspace when this would become a recurring
problem over the following decade. It correctly stated at terrorist groups could use
hijacked airliners, crop dusters, drones, and cruise missiles to attack Canadian
targets and that the government must improve its gathering, tracking, analysis, and
use of threat information.52
One conservative journalistic analysis of this document described it as “drunk
on bureaucratic babble” and “these pages deliver nothing except pious declarations
of intent.” A Liberal Party Senator stressed that Canada needed to spend money on
its military stressing that Army commanders had to scramble to find parts, equipment, and personnel from one another to mobilize; that the Navy had serious
problems with every class of fleet ships being designed to fight yesterday’s wars;
that the Air Force had insufficient capacity to move troops effectively and quickly
to combat zones and humanitarian relief sites; that Canada’s military needed to
increase its size from 62,000 to 90,000 to carry out the demanding tasks assigned to
it by the government; and that while Canadians are spending about $CAN 373 per
capita on defense, Australians and British per capita defense spending are $CAN
688 and $CAN 988 per capita respectively.53
Canada First Defense Strategy 2008 (Stephen Harper)
Liberal Party rule came to an end in 2006 when a minority Conservative Government
was elected under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (CPC-Calgary
Southwest) and remained in power until late 2015 following two successful
reelection campaigns in 2008 and 2011. 54 Harper’s party continued the ongoing
Canadian rhetorical tradition of vowing to increase Canada’s defense capabilities,
achieving some success, then failing to follow through on these rhetorical commitments for various reasons. A $CAN 5.3 billion defense spending increase spread
over five years was introduced in the government’s first budget in May 2006. The
Arctic was an early area of emphasis for the CPC Government with Defence
Minister Gordon O’Connor (CPC-Carleton-Mississippi Mills, ON) announcing in
June 2006 that the Cabinet would approve spending $CAN 3.4 billion for Boeing
C-17 Globemaster air military transport aircraft. However, media revelations in
February 2007 showed the government backing off many of its Arctic promises.55
On May 12, 2008, Harper and Defence Minister Peter Mackay (CPC-Central Nova,
NS) issued the next defence white paper Canada First Defence Strategy.56
Contents of this document stated Canadian forces would have the ability to
conduct the following six core missions:
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• Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and
through NORAD;
• Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
• Respond to a major terrorist attack;
• Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
• Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period, and
• Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.57
Additional commitments and objectives promised by this document included
providing predictable defense spending increases over the next 20 years including
increasing this spending from 1.5%–2% of GDP beginning in Fiscal Year 2011–
2012; increasing such spending from $CAN 18 billion in 2008–2009 to over $30
billion in 2027–2028 for a cumulative total of approximately $CAN 490 billion.
Proposed equipment acquisitions included purchasing 17 new C-130J Hercules
tactical airlift craft, 16 CH-47 Chinook helicopters, three replenishment ships,
2,300 trucks, up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks, and 6–8 Arctic/offshore patrol ships.
Balanced investments were promised in the following foundational military capabilities including personnel, equipment, readiness, and infrastructure. Specific
metrics of these investments included:
• Increasing military personnel to 70,000 regular forces and 30,000 reserve forces;
• Replacing core equipment fleets including:
15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates
10–12 maritime patrol aircraft
17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft
65 next-generation fighter aircraft; and
A fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.

• Strengthening the overall state of Forces readiness to deploy and their ability to
sustain operations once deployed; and
• Improving and modernizing defence infrastructure.58
This policy was praised and criticized by varying sectors of Canadian politics and
the defense community. Laurie Hawn (CPC-Edmonton East, AB) told the House of
Commons on May 14, 2008 that the government supported the Canadian forces,
would provide them the necessary equipment, and provide Canada’s defense industry
with the jobs and tools to achieve these objectives.59
Criticism of the white paper and its funding was expressed on May 16 by MP
Marlene Jennings (LIB-Notre Dame-de-Grâce-Lachine, QC) who criticized the government for not allowing the defense plan to be read and demanded the government
provide more specifics including how much the strategy would cost Canadians.60
A 2010 article in the Canadian Military Journal maintained Canada First was a
good first step for restoring Canada’s international reputation and that $CAN 30
billion in annual defense spending is a small insurance premium for protecting
Canadian interests and the Canadian economy.61 A 2009 article in Survival criticized
Harper’s Government for acknowledging that its northern military moves are
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responding to increased Russian assertiveness, that Harper is recreating “myths of
the Cold War,” and that identifying Russia as a potential threat is contrary to the
Northern Dimension of Canada’s foreign policy declaring that Canada is positioned
to develop an Arctic strategic partnership with Russia. An analysis that same year
by the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute praised this document for summarizing governmental defense perspectives and plans and approved of its proposed
small but steady defense funding increases. However, it also faulted Canada First
for having an excessively general strategic framework and failing to prioritize its
initiatives.62
A 2009 consultant’s report prepared for DND revealed various findings about
support for Canada’s military, awareness of defense spending, and different regional
breakdowns in support for Canadian defense efforts. Report findings revealed that
82% of respondents support the Canadian Forces with over 54% strongly supporting
Canadian Forces. Overall support for these forces has historically tended to be lower
in Quebec though there was an increase in support for these forces in this province
from 62–73% between March and December 2009. Public support for significant
government defense spending is fairly high at 75% but in Quebec this falls to 51%
with Alberta ranking highest in support with 91% of this province’s respondents
favoring significant defense spending. 63
Additional report findings showed 61% of Canadians were relatively optimistic
that the government could meet Canada First funding objectives with 71% of those
in Atlantic Canada being most optimistic and 56% of British Columbians being
least optimistic; awareness of plans to increase new military equipment saw 66%
aware of the intent of purchasing land combat vehicles, 63% military aircraft; and
45% ships; only 36% of Canadians believed the Forces had the equipment to do
their job, only 26% believe that DND gets good value when making major equipment purchases, and 71% believed that defense infrastructure spending benefits local
economies.64
During the Harper Government’s tenure in power between 2006 and 2015,
defense spending occurred at the following levels:
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

$CAN 17.066 billion ($15.234 billion)
$CAN 19.255 billion ($16.609 billion)
$CAN 21.100 billion ($17.9 billion)
$CAN 21.828 billion ($18.717 billion)
$CAN 19.255 billion ($16.905 billion)
$CAN 21.808 billion ($17.477 billion)
$CAN 19.978 billion ($16.619 billion)
$CAN $18.764 billion ($15.362 billion)
$CAN $20.076 billion ($15.613 billion)
$CAN $19.431 billion ($15.317 billion)65

During Harper’s Government Canadian defense spending as a percentage of GDP
began in 2006 at 1.2%, peaked at 1.4% in 2009, before dropping to 1% in 2015.66
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A March 23, 2017 NATO analysis revealed that Canada ranked 23rd out of 28 NATO
countries in the percentage of GDP it spent on defense with only Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Spain spending less on defense. This
assessment also revealed that Canada spent 18.06% of its budget on defense equipment which is less than NATO’s guideline of 20% spending on defense equipment,
less than NATO’s recommended 2% of GDP for defense spending, and that Ottawa’s
2015 per capita expenditure was U.S. $492 as opposed to the NATO average of
$939. On a positive note, Canadian military personnel increased from 60,000 in
2009 to 66,000 in 2015 though this last figure declined from a peak of 68,000
between 2011 and 2013.67
2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged (Justin Trudeau)
After nearly ten years of Harper’s Government, in late 2015 the Canada’s electoral
pendulum shifted with Canadians reverting to a Liberal Government with Justin
Trudeau (LIB-Papineau-QC) as Prime Minister. In May 2017, this Trudeau’s Government, including Defence Minister Harjat Singh Sajjan (LIB-Vancouver South)
released its new white paper Strong Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.68
Compilation of this document involved a public consultation process including
crowdsourcing from various individuals and organizations. Nearly 20,200 online
submissions to the Defence Policy Review were made through an online consultation portal and over 4,700 participants contributed comments or votes using this
forum. Eight cross-country roundtable meetings were held with two in Ottawa and
the others in Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Yellowknife.
House and Senate Defence Committees also contributed to the process as did
indigenous Canadians. An online public consultation report based on this feedback
was released on October 24, 2016.69
University of Calgary Political Science Professor Rob Huebert stressed the
Arctic’s renewed geopolitical importance stressing increasing American and Russian
aircraft and submarine capabilities in this region. Maintaining that this requires
Canada to rethink its previous emphasis on Arctic cooperation, he urged Canada
and NORAD to improve an aerial surveillance system which had not been updated
since 1985 and to make a decision on replacing the aging fleet of CF-18 jet fighters.
He also stressed that Canada needs to rethink former Prime Minister Harper’s
decision that there is no place for NATO in the Arctic by contending that Canada
should accept Finland and Sweden into NATO membership in order to strengthen
Arctic defense against a resurgent Russia which has been making increasing aerial
incursions into those countries.70
David Bercuson, a University of Calgary historian colleague of Huebert’s stressed
the perennial problem of Ottawa’s unwillingness to meet the NATO standard of
spending at least 2% of its GDP on defense. He also maintained that Canada must
decide which global parts are most important to Canada’s interests; which defense
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spectrum arenas Canada should try to cover; and the extent to Canada engage
militarily in areas where it has limited national interests.71
Dr. Karen Breeck, the former President of Medical Women of Canada who as
served as a Canadian Forces flight surgeon, complained that the Canadian military’s
force structure was:
still largely based on the stereotypical soldier of Canada’s past: male,
white, European background, able-bodied, heterosexual, married with a
stay-at-home wife, born in Canada, English or French mother tongue,
Christian religious background, and with a core notion that war and
soldiers = masculinity, as reinforced by Hollywood and popular media. If
diversity truly is our strength as a nation and people are our most
important asset, then defence priorities, policies, and practices must support
and enable the “other” as a full and valued CAF team member.

She went on to maintain that the Canadian military should provide nationalized
funding to ensure address gender integration problems including research, military
equipment modification, life support equipment, pregnancy related needs, and
formalize, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned from such integration.72
Jennifer Allen Simons of the Vancouver-based Simons Foundation stressed
pleasure that Canada was taking up its former position at the United Nations (UN),
seeking a UN Security Council seat, maintained that conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, and maintained diplomatic engagement should be more important
than military conflict. She went on to assert that “currently no threats to Canada
require a military response;” that threats to Canada are natural disasters and terrorist
threats; that Canada should not participate in ballistic missile defense since the threat
of missile attack has grown more slowly than anticipated; that China is threatened
by U.S. sea-based anti-missile defenses; that Canada should rejuvenate nuclear
disarmament; and that Ottawa should not invest in fighter aircraft since it is not
under threat from such weaponry.73
Strong Secure and Engaged also includes the fingerprints of Foreign Minister
Chrystia Freeland (LIB-University Rosedale, ON) whose foreword to this document
proclaims that defense policy will make it possible for Canada to implement a
“progressive, feminist foreign” policy to achieve shared objectives. An earlier journalistic essay by Friedland saw her describe Russian President Vladimir Putin as
“cuddly, cooing,” expressed hope that he might only serve two terms as President,
and would eventually consider a second career as an environmental activist.74
This white paper claimed it was the most rigorously costed Canadian defense
policy ever, that it would meet Canada’s domestic and international defense needs,
and that governmental defense spending would increase from $CAN 18.9 million
in 2016–2017 to $CAN 32.7 million in 2026–2027. It stressed it would provide
various kinds of support for Canadian military personnel and their families while
also promoting an agenda of social engineering by increasing the number of women
in Canada’s military from 15% of personnel in 2017 to 25% of personnel in 2016.75
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Force structure enhancements promised by this document including acquiring
15 surface combatant ships for the RCN and recapitalizing the Canadian Army’s
land combat capabilities and aging vehicle fleets along with modernizing command
and control systems in order to expand its light force capabilities to be more agile
and effective in complex operational theaters including peace operations. Strong
Secure Engaged committed to acquiring 88 advanced fighter aircraft for the RCAF
for enforcing Canadian aerial sovereignty, meet its NORAD and NATO commitments, and recapitalize aircraft such as the CP-140 Aurora anti-submarine warfare
and surveillance aircraft. Additionally, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command is to be given the means to expand its operational capacity and invest in
capabilities enabling rapidly deployable and agile forces to carry out domestic and
international missions.76
Force projection enhancements also aspired to in Strong Secure Engaged include
increasing the size of regular Canadian armed forces by 3,500 to 71,500 enhancing
Arctic coverage with drone aircraft and enhanced satellite capability, enhancing
cyber capabilities by hardening defenses and conducting active cyber operations
against potential enemies in government authorized military missions, and developing capabilities such as supporting two sustained deployments of 500–1,500
personnel, a one time-limited deployment of 500–1,500 personnel for 6–9 months
duration, and expanding abilities to provide civil assistance to authorities in terrorist
or disaster situations.77
A good example of how this is more a social policy document than a national
security policy document is reflected in the number of times selected individual
words appear within its contents:
Ballistic Missiles
China
Diversity
Gender
Inclusion
Islam
North Korea
Nuclear
Peacekeeping
Russia
Strategic
Strategy
Terrorism
War

2
3
47
40
17
0
4
13
7
10
19
28
18
278

Strong Secure Engaged is an egregious example of using a defense white paper as
a document for promoting victim oriented group identity political objectives such
as diversity and gender theory instead of containing sound military policy and threat
analysis. The purpose of defense white papers is providing credible strategies and
the sustained financial resources necessary to meet national security objectives
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through diplomatic, economic, military, and political means such as combat readiness and collaboration with allied countries.
Strong Secure Engaged received favorable support from the Liberal Party when
it was unveiled in Parliament, but scorching criticism from the CPC opposition.
Defence Minister Sajjan said on May 29, 2017 that Canada had tripled its trainers
and doubled its intelligence on Iraq and that funding in the defense policy review
would give Canadian forces the predictable and sustainable funding escalator they
need to carry out their operations. On June 13, 2017, Jean Rioux (LIB-St. Jean,
QC) contended that Conservative mismanagement of renewing Canada’s jet fighter
fleet had forced the Liberal Government to explore purchasing 18 new fighters until
a replacement for the CF-18 could be found and that a modern air fleet was vital
for Canada to defend its airspace and sovereignty.79
Five days earlier, Shadow Defence Minister James Bezan (CPC-Selkirk, Interlake, Eastman, MB) proclaimed:
Yesterday, the Minister of National Defence presented Canadians with a
book of empty promises. In two years the Liberals have failed to deliver a
single piece of military equipment, and they do not plan on buying
anything for our troops until after the next election. The Prime Minister
already believes that our troops are appropriately provisioned. The Minister
of National Defence cannot explain where the money is going to come
from. When the Minister of Finance was asked about this yesterday, he
said, “Go ask the defence minister. Where is the money going to come
from?80

Bezan resumed his attack on Sajjan and what he saw as shortcomings in defense
planning and funding with this June 20 riposte:
Mr. Speaker, we are not questioning the minister’s record. We are
questioning his trustworthiness. Case in point, the sole-sourcing for 18
Super Hornets where the capability gap is imaginary. We already know
that 88% of defence experts and 13 former Royal Canadian Air Force
commanders have said there is no capability gap.
We have already seen $12 billion worth of cuts in two budgets under
this minister. The government has done a defence policy review, but there
is no money to actually resource it. If there is no money to resource it,
then it is a book of empty promises.
The minister has been out there doing his tour. Canadians and
members of the Canadian Armed Forces are hoping it is his farewell tour,
because this is a minister who has gone out, and tried to sell something
when we know the money is not in the budget. The Minister of Finance
has said that currently the Canadian Armed Forces are properly provisioned. I can tell the House the money is not there to do the things the
government says it is going to do.81
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Analysis – A 2017 report by Canada’s Conference of Defence Associations (CDA)
wearily proclaimed that repeated Canadian governments came to power proclaiming
that “Canada is back” and that defense policy reviews have been sporadic occurrences. It went on to argue that the Trudeau Government may not have had real
interest in a serious and extensive review of national defense policy, and that governmental defense policy should focus on just defending Canada but being victorious
in defending Canada. CDA went on to argue the “government must overcome its
debilitating timidity about defence matters” and that effective defense never has
been, never is, and never will be cheap. It also criticized Canada for following the
opposite of Theodore Roosevelt’s aphorism of “speak softly and carry a big stick”
and that over the past five decades Canada has relied heavily on U.S. taxpayers to
defend it.82
The Macdonald-Laurier Institute also excoriated this white paper. While acknowledging it made important contributions to improving the military’s ability to manage
threats and advance Canada’s overseas interests, it asserted it did not provide an
adequate conceptual foundation for DND to plan for the future. It faulted Strong
Secure Engaged for vaguely speaking of Canada’s declining to identify specific
threats facing Canada and its allies, and not linking threats facing Canadian interests
to actual responses. Such failure in providing proper planning guidance hinders the
military’s ability to adapt to emerging contingencies in an accelerating technologically developing security environment revolutionizing the conduct of war.
Macdonald-Laurier said that without prioritizing Canadian Forces must prepare for
all scenarios scattering finite resources over a wide area leaving significant capabilities gaps.83
Canadians have conflicting and often ambiguous attitudes on military policy
matters according to recent polling by Angus Reid and Forum Research Inc. A June
15, 2017 poll on important issues facing Canadians found terrorism and security
was ranked as the most important by 13% of respondents behind the economy, the
deficit/government spending, health care, and jobs/unemployment. An October 24,
2014 poll showed that 55% of Canadians said they were not confident in the ability
of security services to prevent domestic terrorist acts, 50% of Canadians consider
terrorism and ISIS top security threats ahead of Russian aggression and climate
change. A September 25, 2014 poll showed 2/3 of Canadians supported some kind
of involvement in U.S.-led action against ISIS, 38% supporting Canada sending
military advisors to assist the U.S., 28% favoring using Canadian troops; 23%
opposing Canadian involvement, 11% not sure; and 73% thinking U.S. efforts
against ISIS will achieve some success against ISIS. A May 26, 2014 poll found
that 44% of Canadians have a great deal of trust in Canada’s military making it the
country’s most trusted institution; an April 16, 2015 poll showed 48% of Canadians
approving and 40% disapproving of a Canadian Forces mission to Ukraine with
this support being most popular among males, middle income individuals, individual
in the prairie provinces and Alberta, Conservatives, and Anglophones and least
popular in Quebec, among Liberals, New Democrats, and Francophones. Finally,
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an October 17, 2017 poll noted fears of nuclear war among Canadians are rising
with 55% of respondents describing this as a very serious or fairly serious problem
for Canada and 29% of Canadians saying they should join the U.S. ballistic missile
defense system with 44% of Canadians should not join this system. 84
Conclusion
The insularity many Canadians may have felt toward global security topics was
brutally shattered with the October 22, 2014 attack in Ottawa on the Canadian War
Memorial and Canadian Parliament by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau resulting in the murder
of a Canadian soldier. Zehaf-Bibeau was killed by a parliamentary security officer
inside the Houses of Parliament while many members were present including
Prime Minister Stephen Harper. A report on this incident expressed concern over
duplicative security jurisdiction over the Parliament Hill complex between the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Provincial Police, and parliamentary security
forces.85
Canada has contributed and continues making positive contributions and sacrifices for global security and advancing freedom. This has been demonstrated in
Afghanistan where 158 Canadian soldiers were killed between 2002 and 2011 and
by Ottawa’s valued contributions to NATO and NORAD.86 Canada’s 2016 defense
budget is $CAN 20.322 billion ($15.157 billion); active duty personnel in Canadian
Forces number 63,000 out of a July 1, 2017 population of 36,708,083, and the 2016
Warsaw Summit of NATO countries saw Canada agree to provide 450 personnel to
a battle group in Latvia.87
Unfortunately, commitment to essential defense spending and serious military
strategic planning and sustainment have been an afterthought for decades in Canadian defense white papers and political debate. A key problem underlying this lack
of sustained Canadian commitment to military policymaking is that social programs
take preeminence in Canadian political priorities and government spending. Recent
articles maintain that the influence of Canada’s 1966 Medical Care Act gives Canada a social welfare commitment resulting in political leaders giving preferential
treatment to “butter” over “guns,” regardless of their partisan perspective, consequentially leaving augmenting social spending as a focal prerequisite for enhancing
the political survival of Canadian leaders.88
This schizophrenia between short-term rhetoric on fulfilling national security
requirements and domestic social spending and prioritizing perceived social policy
requirements has been reflected in the text of the Canadian defense white papers
analyzed here and in other Canadian defense policy statements and debate.
Another recent example of this schizophrenia appears in a June 2017 parliamentary
committee report on the importance of naval forces to Canadian security. This
document’s conclusion featured many sensible recommendations such as ensuring
that the RCN is a key pillar of national security and sovereignty; that the fleet’s
size and budget be increased to meet domestic and international obligations; that a
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National Shipbuilding Strategy be supported; that the submarine fleet be replaced
and upgraded to have under-ice capabilities, that drone technology be integrated into
the fleet for Arctic and maritime domain awareness; and that there be increased
focus and doctrine to advance Canada’s Arctic naval capability and presence.
Unfortunately, this same document also let itself fall into the abyss of group
identity politics when said the RCN “must ensure that its personnel better reflect
Canadian society….”89
The quality of Canadian defense policymaking is also constrained by weak
parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary defense committees do not have access to
classified information. Such access could be statutorily granted by Parliament but
this has not occurred. Consequently, this enables the government to keep such information from these committees limiting their ability to engage in intense oversight
of defense matters. It also results in opposition parliamentarians preferring to engage
in public criticism instead of secret monitoring of DND and the armed forces.
Effective parliamentary oversight of defense is essential if Canada hopes to upgrade
the quality of its military power and defense activities. Ottawa’s defense policymaking commitments are also weakened by an internationalist orientation and
reputational concerns combining to create a cycle of engagement and re-engagement
where extrication from military commitments comes with high reputational costs.
A result of this is Canadian participation in multilateral operations is being seen as
a good ally but ceding control over the strategic duration of these commitments to
forces beyond national control or not participating in such commitments and risking
international standing.90
Demonstration of the relatively short-term nature of Canadian international
military operational commitments is reflected in the following two tables:
Canada’s Military Missions Since 2001
Year
Commitment
Afghanistan 2001
Combat mission, Kandahar
2003
ISAF rotation, Kabul
2005
Combat and Provincial
Reconstruction (PRT) Kandahar
2006
First Kandahar extension
2008
Second Kandahar extension
2010
NATO training mission
Libya
March 2011
Naval and air support
June 2011
Naval and air support
September 2011
Naval and air support
Anti-ISIS
October 2014
Training; air campaign
March 2015
Training; air campaign
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Duration
6 months
12 months
9–12 months & 18
months
2 years
3 years
4 years
3 months
3 months
3 months
6 months
12 months

Canada’s Strategic Duration Explained
Year
Duration
Afghanistan 2001
6 months
2003
12 months
2005
9–12 months
and 18 months
2006
2 years
2008
3 years
2010
4 years
Libya
March 2011
3 months
June 2011
3 months
September 2011
3 months
Anti-ISIS
October 2014
6 months
March 2015
12 months

Explanation
Logistical
Alliance, operational
Alliance
Alliance, multilateral, dyadic
Alliance, multilateral, dyadic
Alliance, dyadic
Alliance
Alliance
Alliance
Pragmatic
Pragmatic, electoral91

Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1937 asked if it was possible for
Canada to maintain friendly relations with the U.S. and ignore its defenses. An
internal government memorandum published soon after contended that if Canada
placing its defense in American hands “would virtually make us a Protectorate of
the United States – subjecting all our external policy and some of our internal
policy to the supervision of Washington.92
In a world characterized by increasing Russian aggression in the Arctic, Middle
East, and Eastern Europe; Chinese aggression in the East and South China Seas; an
increasingly bellicose North Korea developing a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching
North America; various forms of Islamist terrorism; and assorted methods of cyber
warfare, spaced-based power projection, and weapons of mass destruction; Canada
can no longer cling to the belief that its good intentions immunize it from hostile
global forces. Canadians must learn to accept hard power realities of international
affairs, the innate and unrelenting aggression of human nature and international
power politics, and the threats of external aggression and potential subversion to its
security and vital interests.
This can be done by increasing and sustaining its defense spending to well over
the NATO recommended 2% of GDP, increasing the size of its active duty armed
forces to over 100,000, augmenting its air, land, and naval capabilities to achieve
greater interoperability with NATO countries, developing forces capable of sustaining unilateral expeditionary operations, joining the U.S. ballistic missile defense
system, exclusively focusing its military policymaking on defending its vital
interests in North America, Europe, and the Asia–Pacific in collaboration with
NATO and Pacific Rim allies, and making its Defence Minister the most important
cabinet position after the Prime Minister.
Canada must jettison its utopian belief in peacekeeping and social engineering
as valid instruments of national security policymaking and make the requisite
financial and human resource commitments necessary to national defense in its
force structure and defense policymaking documents. This must be done, even at
the expense of popular social programs and its perceived internationalist reputation,
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if Ottawa wants to be taken seriously as a credible player in international security
policymaking among the world’s democratic countries.93
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